Return to VANA archive page

Threats To Use Nuclear Weapons:

The Sixteen Known Nuclear Crises of the Cold War, 1946-1985

by David R. Morgan, National President, Veterans Against Nuclear Arms Vancouver, Canada

March 6, 1996

INTRODUCTION

During the 39 years of the Cold War, the United States of America led the nuclear arms race, repeatedly threatened to use nuclear weapons, and brought civilization to the brink of destruction on several occasions. This is an appalling record, but there is no reason to believe that any other great power having the same advantages as the U.S.A. would have acted any better. The human race is ill-equipped to deal with nuclear weapons.

The Cold War and the Soviet nuclear threat to the U.S.A. was ended by Mikhail Gorbachev. It is now widely believed, however, that the U.S.A. "won the Cold War." The very dangerous crises of the Cold War, their threats distorted by propaganda at the time, are now almost totally forgotten. The role of the military establishment that led us into these crises remains unquestioned, its prestige untarnished. The public remains in ignorance.

This paper is an attempt to inform the public simply and clearly about the very dangerous nuclear crises of the Cold War. Until these are widely understood, the great dangers of present policies will not be questioned and discussed. The U.S.A., with its Freedom of Information Act, is the least secretive of all the world's great powers. Much of the information in this summary has been made available by the benefit of this Act. Members of the public are thus enabled to inform themselves of the way that nuclear weapons have threatened world security.

There are 36,000 nuclear weapons in the world in 1996 and the threat of the destruction of civilization by these weapons remains very great. The more that nuclear weapons increase military power, the more they decrease national security. The only escape from this paradox is by the balanced reduction and eventual total abolition of these weapons on a rigid schedule. This is a matter of great urgency; the present lull in great power rivalry may not last long.

SUMMARY

During the 39 years (or 468 months) 1946-1985, there was:
1. A serious threat of nuclear weapons use for 107 months (23% of time);
2. A serious threat of nuclear war that would destroy most of U.S.A., U.S.S.R. and Europe during these major crises: VIETNAM I, CHINA I, SUEZ, CHINA II, BERLIN II, BERLIN III, CUBA, VIETNAM II, IRAN II and FIRST STRIKE, a total of 55 months (12% of time);
3. A serious threat of the extinction of much of life on the globe from the effects of Nuclear Winter during all major crises after BERLIN II, March 1959: a total of 38.5 months (8% of time).

Table II Nuclear Crises of the Cold War

PERIOD 1 1945-49: U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPON MONOPOLY
1945 WW II ends with A-Bombing of Hiroshima (6 Aug) and Nagasaki (9 Aug)

• 1946 Iran I and Yugoslavia Crises #1 and #2
• 1948-49 Berlin I Crisis #3
• 1949 Soviets explode A-bomb (Sep) and China goes communist

PERIOD 2 1949-62: NUKE THEM BEFORE THEY CAN NUKE US
1950 Korean War Crisis #4: strong pressure on President Truman
(and later-on President Eisenhower in 1954) to use the A-Bomb

• 1953 U.S.A. tests the first H-Bomb (31 Oct)
• 1954 Vietnam I Crisis #5; U.S.S.R tests H-Bomb
• 1955 China I Crisis #6
• 1956 Suez Crisis #7
• 1957 U.S.S.R. launches Sputnik, the first satellite (4 Oct)
• 1958 China II Crisis #8
• 1959 Berlin II Crisis #9
  1960 U.S.A. launches the first Polaris nuclear submarine
• 1961 Berlin III Crisis #10
• 1962 Cuba Crisis #II

PERIOD 3 1962-69: SCARED STRAIGHT

• 1963 Test Ban Treaty (4 Aug ); Kennedy assassinated (22 Nov)
• 1964 Khrushchev ousted (15 Oct); China tests A-Bomb (16 Oct)
• 1967 China tests H-Bomb (17 Jun)
• 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam (31 Jan)

PERIOD 4 1969-83: RELENTLESS ARMS RACE

• 1969 Vietnam II Crisis #12 (Aug-Oct)
• 1970 Jordan Crisis #13; U.S.A. MIRVs land-based ICBMs (multiple warheads)
• 1971 U.S.A. MIRVs its submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles
• 1972 last U.S. combat troops leave Vietnam (11 Aug)
• 1973 Israel Crisis #13(Yom Kippur); Soviets first MIRV an ICBM
• 1974 India tests A-bomb
• 1975 fall of Saigon to the communists (29 Apr)
• 1976 secret funding of SDI (Star Wars) begins
• 1979 U.S.S.R. invades Afghanistan (Dec)
• 1979 Shah of Iran flees (16 Jan) and U.S. Embassy seized (4 Nov)
  1980 Iran II Crisis #15, President Carter sanctions First Strike (PD59)
• 1981 Reagan launches the biggest arms drive in history: $1.6 trillion
• 1982 Swedish Academy Report says that a massive nuclear war will cause a
  Nuclear Winter, thus threatening life on the whole earth.

PERIOD 5 1985-91: GORBACHEV ENDS THE COLD WAR

• 1986 “Year of Peace”; nuclear-tests: U.S.A. fifteen, U.S.S.R. zero
• 1987 Secretary Gorbachev and Pres. Reagan sign INF Treaty (8 Dec)
• 1988 Gorbachev allows Polish Elections (June)
• 1989 Gorbachev allows demolition of Berlin Wall (9 Nov)
  1990
• 1991 U.S.A. launches “Desert Storm” (17 Jan); Gorbachev ousted
  (19 Aug); Yeltsin and leaders of Ukraine and White Russia meet
  and abolish the U.S.S.R. (8 Dec)

PERIOD 6 1991-: POST-COLD-WAR REGROUPINGS
Similar to PERIOD 3 (Scared Straight); effective nuclear arms
control needed or PERIOD 4 (Relentless Arms Race) may repeat with dire results.

PERIOD 1 1945-49: U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPON MONOPOLY
1945 was a pivotal year in world history:

• May: WW II ended with the defeat of Germany mainly by the U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and the U.K.
• 16 Jul: First atomic test explosion,
• 6 Aug: Hiroshima destroyed by an atomic bomb.
• 9 Aug: Nagasaki destroyed by an atomic bomb.

The U.S.A. had thus rapidly shown that it was prepared to use this new ultra-destructive weapon, with its lingering poisonous effects, in the same way as conventional weapons. President Truman believed that the Soviet Union would never be able to make an atomic bomb. He did not hesitate to use the threat of the U.S. atomic bomb against the Soviet Union. The first such threats came only ten months after the end of WW II, in disputes over the Soviet-Iranian border area (Crisis # 1, IRAN I) and the Balkans (Crisis #2, YUGOSLAVIA I).

Crisis # 3, BERLIN I, was much more serious and lasted for 15 months. The terminal event of this period came on 3 September 1949, when the Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb. The U.S. monopoly of nuclear weapons had lasted barely four years.

Nuclear Crisis # 1 YEAR: 1946

NAME OF CRISIS: IRAN I (Azerbaijan)
THREATENED USE OF N-WEAPONS BY: U.S.A.
TARGET OF WEAPONS: U.S.S.R.
CRISIS STARTS: Mar 1946
CRISIS ENDS: 48 hours after Truman’s ultimatum
THREAT OF NUCLEAR ATTACK: Stated
AT ISSUE IN CRISIS: British pre-war domination of Iran was challenged after the war by the Soviets.
BACKGROUND: During WW II there was a U.S.A. and Soviet wartime agreement to occupy Iran jointly. This denied it to the Germans and allowed aid convoys to enter the U.S.S.R. through Iran. After WW II, the Soviets demanded oil concessions equal to those of the British, as previously agreed. To enforce this claim Soviet troops remained in northern Iran and supported a revolutionary movement in Azerbaijan Province adjoining Soviet territory. The Soviets moved tanks to the border and showed no sign of removing their troops from Iran by 2 March 1946 as agreed by them at the London Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers.
CRISIS: President Truman meets personally with Soviet Ambassador Gromyko and delivers an ultimatum: Remove Soviet troops in 48 hours or the U.S.A. will drop the atomic bomb. “We’re going to drop it on you,” Truman is reported to say to Gromyko.

OUTCOME: Soviets removed their troops in 24 hours. This threat of an A-bomb attack on the Soviet Union by Truman came only 10 months after the end of WW II. Three months after this crisis, on 14 June 1946, the U.S.A. presented the Baruch Plan for the international control of nuclear material for the production of atomic energy. Soviet rejection of this plan must now be viewed in the light of their experience of U.S.A. “atomic control” in the IRAN I crisis over Azerbaijan.

Nuclear Crisis # 2 YEAR: 1946

NAME OF CRISIS: YUGOSLAVIA
THREATENED USE OF N-WEAPONS BY: U.S.A.
TARGET OF WEAPONS: Yugoslavia?
CRISIS STARTS: Nov 1946
CRISIS ENDS: Nov 1946
THREAT OF NUCLEAR ATTACK: Implied
AT ISSUE IN CRISIS: 1) U.S. military aircraft shot down over Yugoslavia; 2) U.S.A. right to over-fly Yugoslavia; 3) Greece, a strategic base in the Balkans.
BACKGROUND: During WW II, left-wing guerrilla groups in Yugoslavia and Greece were the most active in fighting the German occupation and received British support. Yugoslavia was the only European country to free itself from the German invaders without help, and emerged from WW II, as an independent, communist state. Neighbouring Hungary, Roumania and Bulgaria were freed by the Red Army from German occupation and then became communist states under Soviet control. In neighbouring Greece to the south, however, a civil war raged from 1945-1949 in which the left-wing ELAS guerrillas were opposed by right-wing Greek groups. With the German army gone, the British switched their support and, until they withdrew in early 1947, helped these right-wing groups. The U.S.A. replaced the British and provided major military aid to the Greek right-wing forces in an increasingly severe civil war. Yugoslavia gave aid to ELAS forces and was considered hostile to U.S. interests, as the U.S.A. became increasingly involved in the Greek civil war.
CRISIS EVENTS: 1946 November: A U.S. military aircraft is shot down over Yugoslavia. Six B-29s are deployed to Germany and then flown across the Yugoslav border, in a show of force. OUTCOME: No more U.S. military aircraft were shot down over Yugoslavia.

Nuclear Crisis # 3 YEAR: 1948

NAME OF CRISIS: BERLIN I
THREATENED USE OF N-WEAPONS BY: U.S.A.
TARGET OF WEAPONS: 24 Soviet cities (Operation BROILER)
CRISIS STARTS: 24 Jun 1948, Berlin blockaded
CRISIS ENDS: 30 Sep 1949, access restored DURATION: 15 months
THREAT OF NUCLEAR ATTACK: Stated
AT ISSUE IN CRISIS: Control of Berlin, Germany and Europe
BACKGROUND: 1945, 2 May: Red Army took Berlin, losing 100,000 men.

• 7 May: Germany surrendered. The Red Army met the American and British armies 100 miles west of Berlin along the Elbe, as agreed. Soviets allowed U.S., British and French forces to share control of Berlin, also as agreed. Total Soviet WW II losses: 26 million, or one out of every 7 Russians. Total American losses: 292,000, or one out of every 513 Americans. Destruction in U.S.S.R.: 17,000 towns, 70,000 villages, 31,000 factories, 84,000 schools, 40,000 miles of railroad track. Destruction in U.S.A.: nil. Soviet aims after WW II were: 1) neutralization of Germany; 2) a “wall” of friendly states on the U.S.S.R. western frontier; 3) to recover and rebuild. The Soviets built their “wall” by imposing harsh communist governments on Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. A steady breakdown of relations between the U.S.S.R and the Western powers then followed.
  1946, March: IRAN I Crisis #1, when Truman first threatened to use A-bomb.
• 5 Mar: Churchill first spoke of the “Iron Curtain” in Fulton Missouri.
• Sep: Elections in Berlin showed no support for Soviets in West sectors.
  1947, 12 Mar: Truman Doctrine of U.S. Military support for West Europe.
• 5 Jun: Marshall Plan for U.S. Economic support of West Europe. 1948, Feb: communist coup in Czechoslovakia so that, in Central Europe, only the status of Germany was still undecided.
  CRISIS EVENTS: 1948, 24 Jun: Russians cut land access to Berlin.
• Jul: Emergency airlift to West Berlin by the U.S.A. and U.K. begins
• 28 Jul: Forrestal (Secretary of Navy), George Marshall (Secretary of State) and Omar Bradley (Army Chief of Staff) meet to decide if Operation BROILER should be executed in response to the Berlin blockade.
• 9 Sep: Forrestal asks British Admiral Sir Frederick Dalrymple about British willingness to see the bomb used.
• 10 Sep: Forrestall asks Marshall to give authority to use the A-bomb to commanders in the field. This meeting concludes with the production of NSC 30, which gives the President alone power to order an A-bomb attack.
• 13 Oct: Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) send a top secret memorandum to the National Security Council (NSC) demanding to know whether the U.S.A. should launch atomic war on the U.S.S.R.
• 14 Oct: JCS and NSC meet but JCS fail to get permission to launch war.
• 1949, 30 Sep: access to Berlin restored and airlift and crisis ends.

OUTCOME: In September 1949 the Soviets tested their first atomic bomb, so this was the last crisis in which the U.S.A. had a monopoly of N-weapons.
In October China became communist with the victory of Mao Tse-Tung. Also in October, the “Admirals’ Revolt” with Admirals Ostie, Burke and Denfield testifying to the House Armed Services Committee that an atomic blitz is “morally wrong.” was quelled by Truman firing Denfield, a warning to all U.S. officers that open criticism of nuclear policy meant dismissal. The division of Berlin and Germany hardened for the duration of the Cold War.

PERIOD 2. 1949-1962: NUKE THEM FIRST

The detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb on 3 September 1949 was a great shock to the U.S. leadership in Washington, who had expected at least a ten-year lead. This was followed almost immediately, in October 1949, by the victory of Mao Tsetung’s communist forces in China. If China’s neighbours Indonesia and India also became communist, most of the world’s population would then be in the communist camp.

These were major strategic setbacks for Washington and NSC 68 (14 April 1950) was the policy response by the U.S. National Security Council. It called for:

1. containment of the socialist bloc (U.S.S.R. and China) by a 6,000 mile chain of nuclear bases, extending from Europe, through the Middle East and South-East Asia to Japan and Alaska;
2. massive re-armament, building theHydrogen bomb, stockpiling A-bombs and building a long-range bomber fleet.

“The date the Soviets possess an atomic stockpile of 200 bombs would be a critical date for the United States.” (NSC 68). This anticipated date was 1954. The nuclear arms race was now launched. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower came under very heavy pressure in the National Security Council, especially from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to launch nuclear war against China and the U.S.S.R., especially during the Korean War and after the U.S.S.R. exploded its first Hydrogen bomb on 12 August 1953.

The eight nuclear crises, starting with the Korean Crisis in 1950 and culminating with the Cuban crisis in 1962, make this thirteen years the second most dangerous period in human history. The most dangerous period happened during the First Strike Crisis #16 when nuclear stockpiles and destructive potentials were enormously greater.

Nuclear Crisis # 4 Year: 1950

NAME OF CRISIS: KOREA THREATENED
USE OF N-WEAPONS BY: U.S.A.
TARGET OF WEAPONS: North Korea, China and U.S.S.R.
CRISIS STARTS: Jun 1950, North Korea invades South Korea
CRISIS ENDS: Jul 1953 Armistice at Panmunjon.
DURATION: 3 years
THREAT OF NUCLEAR ATTACK: Truman, “There has always been consideration of its use.”; Eisenhower, “To keep the attack from becoming costly, it was clear we would have to use atomic weapons.” The War Plan was Operation SHAKEDOWN, with plans 6 days after the start of WW III for:

• bombers from Maine to drop 20 A-bombs in the Moscow-Gorki area;
• bombers from Labrador to drop 12 A-bombs in the Leningrad area;
• bombers from U.K. to drop 52 A-bombs in the Volga and Donets Basin;
• bombers from the Azores to drop 15 A-bombs in the Caucasus area.
• bombers from Guam to drop 15 A-bombs in Vladivostok and Irkutsk areas.

AT ISSUE IN CRISIS: threat to South Korea by North Korea backed by the new Chinese Communist Chinese power in the area. BACKGROUND: 1949, Sep: the communists, under Mao Tse-Tung, won control of China.

• Oct: Soviets tested their first A-bomb. There was soon great pressure within the U.S. leadership to destroy the Soviet Union before it gained nuclear equality. Whether China, now under communist control, was to be a priority for atomic destruction was a hotly contested issue among the JCS and the NSC as the Korean war ran its course.
  CRISIS EVENTS: 1950, June: North Korea invades South Korea. U.N. Security Council (Soviets absent) sends U.N. forces to South Korea. U.N. retreat to Pusan.
• 15 Sep: Inchon landings by U.S.A., traps the North Korean army.
• 7 Oct: U.S. troops cross the 38th-parallel into North Korea.
• 10 Oct: China warns that it will enter the war if U.N. forces advance further into North Korea.
• 24 Nov: Chinese arrive at U.N. to negotiate; U.S.A. begins a big offensive the same day.
• 28 Nov: Rear-Admiral Lalor asks JCS for permission to use A-bomb to discourage intervention by China and thus allow U.N. forces to leave.
• 6 Dec: Chinese army attacks and rapidly drives U.N.-U.S. forces from North Korea.
• 1951, 11 Jan: Symington (chair of NSC) presents NSC-100 calling for a surprise atomic attack on China with an ultimatum to U.S.S.R. to avoid any “aggressive” moves.
• 1 Feb: NSC meeting calls for preparations for total war.
• 10 Apr: Truman fires General McArthur for his insubordinate demands for immediate attacks on Chinese bases.
• 20 Apr: McArthur given hero’s welcome in New York.
• 14 Aug: JCS prepare study of use of the new MK.IX and W-19 tactical atomic weapons in Korea. These could be used without depleting the SHAKEDOWN stockpile for Europe.
  1952 Nov: Eisenhower elected President.
• 31 Oct: U.S.A. tests the first Hydrogen Bomb.
• 1953, 11 Feb: Eisenhower at NSC meeting says, “We should consider the tactical use of atomic weapons in the Kaesong area.”(Korea)
• 19 May: JCS calls for a major offensive that will expand the war effort outside Korea and include use of N-weapons.
• 20 May: JCS present their plans to the NSC. Eisenhower is finally persuaded to use N-weapons in Korea if negotiations fail.
• Jul: Armistice at Panmunjon ends the Korean War,
• 27 Nov: At a meeting with French Prime Minister Laniel and British Prime Minister Churchill, President Eisenhower find both strongly opposed to use of nuclear weapons in Korea if war breaks out again.

OUTCOME: South Korea was secured, with the U.S.A. committed to defend it and maintain large forces there, which are in South Korea up to present.

Nuclear Crisis # 5 YEAR: 1954

NAME OF CRISIS: VIETNAM I (Dien Bien Phu)
THREATENED USE OF N-WEAPONS BY: U.S.A.
TARGET OF WEAPONS: Vietnam; later, China and U.S.S.R.
CRISIS STARTS: 8 Mar 1954 (3000 French surrounded at DBP)
CRISIS ENDS: 19 Jun 1954
DURATION: 3 months
THREAT OF NUCLEAR ATTACK: Implied; U.S. nuclear-armed navy carrier force nearVietnam to launch Operation VULTURE, using of A-bombs against Viet Minh forces. The Strategic Air Command BASIC PLAN will use 735 bombers to attack the U.S.S.R. and China using 1750 A-bombs.
AT ISSUE IN CRISIS: “A-Day”, the last day on which the U.S.A. could launch a nuclear attack on U.S.S.R. without fear of a response, is the probably the real issue, with the threatened fall of the Vietnam “domino” only a pretext.
BACKGROUND: In WW II the Japanese easily captured the French colony ofVietnam, and the only opposition was from the Communist Viet Minh under Ho Chi Minh. In 1945 Japanese surrendered Vietnam to the British, and the French resumed control, but the Viet Minh opposed the return of their run-away colonial masters. France waged a long, failing war against Viet Minh guerrillas. In January 1954 French established a key base at Dien Bien Phu, deep in Vietnam, but the Viet Minh “did the impossible” and brought in heavy artillery.
CRISIS EVENTS:

• 1954, March: DBP under siege with heavy Viet Minh shelling.
• 8 Mar: French General Ely in Washington asks for U.S. help.
• 25 Mar: U.S. Army G3 Section proposes use of A-weapons in Vietnam.
• 7 Apr: Eisenhower’s “Domino Theory”: if Vietnam is lost, all Asia falls.
• 10 Apr: President Eisenhower sends Secretary of State Dulles and Admiral Radford to Europe to push Operation VULTURE, which Prime Minister Churchill opposes (and disagrees with the Domino Theory).
• 23 Apr: French Foreign Minister Bidault refuses Dulles’ offer of 2 A-bombs.
• 27 Apr: Dulles falsely hints to French that Eden of U.K. supports VULTURE.
• 30 Apr: Eisenhower to Cutler of NSC, “We might give the French A-bombs.”
• 8 May: Viet Minh capture Dien Bien Phu.
• 25 May: NSC and Admiral Radford advise A-bombing China if Chinese troops support the Viet Minh drive on Hanoi.
• 19 Jun: Eisenhower,“A-bombing China means A-bombing the U.S.S.R. What would the U.S.A. do with destruction extending from the Elbe to Vladivostok?“China does not intervene and the crisis ends.

OUTCOME: The U.S.A first became involved in Vietnam.

Nuclear Crisis # 6 YEAR: 1954

NAME OF CRISIS: CHINA I (Quemoy and Matsu)
THREATENED USE OF N-WEAPONS BY: U.S.A.
TARGET OF WEAPONS: China, U.S.S.R.
CRISIS STARTS: Sep 1954
CRISIS ENDS: 1 May 1955
DURATION: 8 months
THREAT OF NUCLEAR ATTACK: Stated
AT ISSUE IN CRISIS: 1) Threatened end of the U.S. nuclear monopoly, since new Soviet Bear and Bison A-bombers now put the U.S.A. with in range of attack; 2) communist control of China, a very dangerous development.
BACKGROUND: 1935: Mao Tse-Tung and his communist guerrilla army arrived in North China after the 6,000 mile Long March. Japanese aggression in China began again. 1935-45: Mao’s guerrillas tied up large Japanese forces in North China and offered the only effective resistance to the invaders. All U.S. aid, however, went to Chiang Kai-Shek’s forces holed up in Chungking and avoiding battle.
1945 August: Japan defeated and U.S.A. supplied Chiang’s 4.3 million man army with arms, ammunition and air power for its anti-communist drive. Mao’s 1.2 million guerrillas controlled only the countryside of North China, but Mao’s forces had something that Chiang’s far bigger and better equipped army lacked: support from the peasants who had experienced the brutality of their rule.
1949 Oct: Chiang Kai-shek and his armies were defeated by Mao’s armies and driven into exile in Taiwan. Chiang fortified two islands, Quemoy and Matsu, just 8 miles from the coast of China as bases for his re-conquest of China. Chiang provoked China on two occasions by moving large numbers of troops to these the islands, and both times the U.S.A. went to the nuclear brink in support of Chiang’s provocations.
1953, 2 Feb: President Eisenhower ordered the U.S. Navy no longer to prevent Chiang’s forces on Taiwan from attacking mainland China.
CRISIS EVENTS:

• 1954 Aug: Chiang moves 58,000 troops to Quemoy and 15,000 to Matsu.
• Sep: China begins shelling the islands.
• 12 Sep: Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) recommend A-bombing China.
• 23 Nov: China sentences 13 U.S. airmen, shot down over China during the Korean War; again the JCS call for nuclear strikes against China. (Note that this marks the 6th time in 1954 that almost the entire U.S. leadership, the JCS and NSC, called for nuclear war: VIETNAM Crisis #5, three times; May, in response to Soviet bomb tests; Quemoy and Matsu; Airmen’s Trials.)
• 1955, 15 Feb: Churchill advises against U.S. atomic defence of Quemoy & Matsu.
• 10 Mar: Secretary of State Dulles at a National Security Council (NSC) meeting states that U.S. people and the world have to be prepared for probable U.S.atomic war against China.
• 15 Mar: Dulles states that U.S.A. is seriously considering use of A-weapons in Quemoy and Matsu area.
• 16 Mar: President Eisenhower, “A-bombs can be used…as you would use a bullet.” This sparks Inter national uproar .. NATO foreign ministers oppose atomic attack on China.
• 25 Mar: Admiral Carney, “The President is planning to destroy Red China’s military potential.” He predicts war on April 15.
• 23 Apr: China says at Afro-Asian Conference ready to negotiate on Taiwan.
• 1 May: Shelling of Quemoy and Matsu ceases, and the crisis ends.
• 1 Aug: China releases 11 U.S. airmen.

OUTCOME: 1) Chiang, having almost provoked war between U.S.A. and China, will use this gambit again, with no effective U.S. moves made to prevent this; 2) crude provocations by Chiang (and his U.S. allies) brought China close to atomic destruction and China certainly remembers these events.

Nuclear Crisis # 7 YEAR: 1956

NAME OF CRISIS: SUEZ
THREATENED USE OF N-WEAPONS BY: U.S.S.R and then U.S.A.
TARGET OF WEAPONS: London, Paris (also U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.)
CRISIS STARTS: 29 Oct 1956, Israel invades Egypt
CRISIS ENDS: 6 Nov, Britain and France obey U.N. ceasefire.
DURATION: 7 days THREAT OF NUCLEAR ATTACK: Stated
AT ISSUE IN CRISIS: Egypt’s right to control the Suez Canal; Britain and France see Egyptian control as a threat to their oil supply.
BACKGROUND:
1868: Suez Canal concession granted to France by Egypt’s Turkish rulers.
1859-69: Canal built by a French company.
1875: Britain bought a major interest in the Canal.
1882: Britain occupied Egypt and remains in effective control until 1956. 1936: Britain signed a treaty agreeing to withdraw forces by 1956.
1954: Colonel Nasser became President of a strongly nationalistic Egypt.
1956: last British forces left their bases on the Canal.

• 19 Jul: U.S.A. withdrew financing from the plan to build Aswan Dam.
• 26 Jul: President Nasser of Egypt announced Suez Canal nationalized.
• 10 Aug: Joint British-French military planning to attack Egypt began.
• 2 Sep: President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden,”…American public opinion flatly rejects the thought of using force.” (The U.S.A. then imported only 4% of its oil from Middle East, compared to Europe’s 75%) With an approaching U.S. Presidential election, Eisenhower wanted no crises.
• 14 Oct: French and British planned at Chequers to invite an Israeli attack on Egypt as a pretext for their seizure of the Canal.

CRISIS EVENTS:

• 1956, 29 Oct: Israel invades Sinai and advances to the Suez Canal; Britain and France demand a ceasefire.
• 30 Oct: U.S.A. in the U.N. Security Council leads the attack against this invasion to the dismay of France, Britain and Israel. Britain demands that Egypt allow British forces to re-occupy Canal Zone.
• 5 Nov: Egypt’s refusal is then used as a pretext for the seizure of Port Said by British and French troops, as planned. Khrushchev makes crude threats to, “..use force to crush the aggressors” and hints that London and Paris might suffer atomic attack. This evokes a U.S. counter-threat that any Soviet attack will be met by a U.S. nuclear response.
• 6 Nov: Britain and France agree to the U.N. demand for a ceasefire.

OUTCOME: A strategic disaster for the West in the Middle East: 1) the Suez Canal was blocked and Europe’s oil cut off; 2) Soviet influence rapidly expanded in the Middle East; 3) U.S.A showed that it would not back imperial adventures by U.K. and France; 4) U.S.A. was now master of Western strategy.

Nuclear Crisis # 8 YEAR: 1958

NAME OF CRISIS: CHINA II (Quemoy and Matsu)
THREATENED USE OF N-WEAPONS BY: U.S.A.
TARGET OF WEAPONS: China, U.S.S.R.
CRISIS STARTED: 24 Aug 1958, China shells Quemoy and Matsu
CRISIS ENDED: Oct 1958, shelling ends
DURATION: 2 months
THREAT OF NUCLEAR ATTACK: Stated; U.S. 7th fleet off Chinese coast.
AT ISSUE IN CRISIS: Chiang Kai Shek’s right to mobilize armies on the islands, 8 miles from the coast of China, with the permission of the U.S.A.
BACKGROUND: (see Crisis #6, CHINA I) In August 1958, Chiang Kai-Shek moved 100,000 troops to Quemoy and Matsu. This was over one third of his army. Nuclear-capable U.S. howitzers were moved to Quemoy Island.
CRISIS EVENTS: 1958, 24 Aug: China begins shelling Quemoy and Matsu.

• 6 Sep: U.S.A. learns Chinese Premier Chou en Lai ready to negotiate. General Twining of Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) nevertheless asks President Eisenhower to give U.S 7th Fleet Commander authority to order nuclear strikes against China, but Eisenhower refuses.
• 7 Sep: Soviets inform Eisenhower that in the event of a U.S. nuclear attack they will come to China’s aid.
• 11 Sep: Eisenhower on TV presents the “Domino Theory” of the crisis, but the U.S. public reaction shows very strong opposition to this risky policy. Eisenhower to Dulles, “As much as two thirds of the world and half of U.S. public opinion opposes the course which we have been following.”
• 19 Sep: Soviets repeat their warning of 7 September, and shortly after Secretary of Defence Neil McElroy suggests to Eisenhower that Chiang Kai-Shek be assassinated and replaced. But Eisenhower rejects this plan, and a face-saving formula is worked out with China: they may shell Quemoy and Matsu on odd dates of the month and Chiang’s troops will re-supply on even dates(!) This eventually leads to a ceasefire and the end of the crisis.

OUTCOME: 1) first time a large section of the U.S. public denied Washington its support in a nuclear crisis; 2) losing U.S. support, Chiang ended his crude provocations.

Nuclear Crisis # 9 YEAR: 1959

NAME OF CRISIS: BERLIN II
THREATENED USE OF N-WEAPONS BY: U.S.A.
TARGET OF WEAPONS: U.S.S.R.
CRISIS STARTS: Nov 1958
CRISIS ENDS: 20 Mar(?) 1959
DURATION: 4 months
THREAT OF NUCLEAR ATTACK: Stated
AT ISSUE IN CRISIS: Status of Berlin
BACKGROUND: 1954, 2 Oct: Western European Union agreement signed by France, Britain, U.S.A. and West Germany provided for West German re-armament. The Soviets who had paid such a heavy price to defeat Germany (one Russian in 7 killed) saw this as a major threat and provocation, also a breach of the Potsdam agreement to “completely and finally abolish” German military structures of all types. U.S. investment in West Berlin had turned it into the top manufacturing city in West Germany. Each year 300,000 East Germans escaped to the west via Berlin and from 1949-58, 3 million East Germans had escaped this way. Western radio propaganda and spy operations used West Berlin as a major base. Berlin remained a smouldering fuse to war.
CRISIS EVENTS: 1958, 10 Nov: Khrushchev proposes that control of Berlin be turned over to East Germany in 6 months. The western allies rejected this since it meant granting de facto recognition to East Germany. Post war agreements on Berlin appear threatened and a new blockade of Berlin possible.
1959, 11 Mar: As Khrushchev’s deadline approached Democrats urge Eisenhower to mobilize. At press conference he heatedly rejects this: “We are certainly not going to fight a ground war in Europe.” He refuses to escalate the crisis.

• 15 Mar: Air Force General Chief of Staff Thomas White’s testimony to Senate is released-* the Berlin crisis can lead to war with the Soviet Union and “nuclear weapons may have to be used.”
• 20 Mar: Khrushchev deny any rigid deadline and the crisis subsides.

OUTCOME: Khrushchev and Eisenhower met at Camp David, Maryland, in Sep 1959. Each wished a reasonable solution on Berlin, but their moderate positions were heavily opposed by belligerent Democrats in the U.S.A. and hard-liners in Moscow, with Mao in China calling for wars of national liberation and accusing Khrushchev of “appeasement”. The status of Berlin remained unclear and the situation dangerous.

Nuclear Crisis # 10 YEAR: 1961

NAME OF CRISIS: BERLIN II
THREATENED USE OF N-WEAPONS BY: U.S.A. and U.S.S.R
TARGET OF WEAPONS: U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.
CRISIS STARTS: 13 Ju 1961
CRISIS ENDS: 17 Oct 1961
DURATION: 4 months
THREAT OF NUCLEAR ATTACK: Implied, war plan SIOP-62 with 3,423 Soviet targets and an atomic stockpile of 18,500.
AT ISSUE IN CRISIS: Status of Berlin
BACKGROUND: Germany, seen by the West as a NATO ally and by the Soviets as a foe defeated at enormous cost, is now re-armed. Western presence in Berlin, deep in East Germany was always a cold war trigger. Kennedy, a young President, lacking Eisenhower’s experience, skill and prestige, turned a problem into a crisis by acting tough. His tough posture was helped by new intelligence reports. During 1961 the U.S. Samos satellite sent the first sharp photos of the Soviet Union. They showed that instead of having 200 missiles (CIA estimate) the Soviets had FOUR! Also shown were the exact locations of all 190 Soviet strategic bombers. A disarming “first strike“ by the U.S.A. was therefore possible. This strengthened Kennedy’s hand in the BERLIN III and CUBAN crises.
CRISIS EVENTS:

• 1961 Apr and Jun: Kennedy meets Khrushchev in Vienna over the issue of Germany and Berlin with the possibility of new blockade (see Berlin I, Crisis #3)
• 13 Jul: At NSC meeting Dean Acheson and Lyndon Johnson call for, “proclamation of a national emergency over Berlin.”
• 25 Jul: Kennedy on TV: “We cannot permit the Communists to drive us out of Berlin by force.” Boosts defence budget, calls up reserves and enlarges civil defence measures (A-bomb shelters)
• July: 30,000 refugees flood into West Berlin from East in July.
• 7 Aug: Khrushchev on TV echoes Kennedy’s determination.
• 13 Aug: Soviets seal Berlin crossings to refugees.
• 17 Aug: Construction of Berlin wall begins. Its intent was unclear to Kennedy, who says that there is “one chance in five of a nuclear exchange”.
  Kennedy orders 1,500 U.S. troops to move by land through East Germany to Berlin. They are unopposed.
• 24 Aug: Soviets accuse West of flying “revanchists, extremists, saboteurs and spies” into Berlin.
• 30 Aug: Soviets resume nuclear testing.
• Sep: a full scale, surprise nuclear attack plan by U.S. B47 and B52 bombers is considered by Kennedy, McNamara, Maxwell Taylor and Bundy. When McNamara probes Lord Mountbatten, chief of British Defence staff, about this plan, Mountbatten says: “My God, anybody who thinks of that is mad!”
• 17 Oct: Khrushchev at 22nd Party Congress says West understands German and Berlin issues and is willing to negotiate. The crisis ends.

OUTCOME: Berlin issue de-fused again. Kennedy and Khrushchev’s improved contact is critical in the much more serious CUBA Crisis #11 of 1962.

Nuclear Crisis # 11 YEAR: 1962

NAME OF CRISIS: CUBA
THREATENED USE OF N-WEAPONS BY: U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.
TARGET OF WEAPONS: U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.
CRISIS STARTS: 14 Oct 1962 (U-2 photos of missile bases)
CRISIS ENDS: 28 Oct 1962 (Khrushchev will remove missiles)
DURATION: 2 weeks
THREAT OF NUCLEAR ATTACK: Stated
AT ISSUE IN CRISIS: 1) security of Cuba; 2) security of U.S.A.; 3) right of U.S.S.R. to match U.S. medium range nuclear-missile threat.
BACKGROUND: 17 Apr 1961, 1400 Cuban exiles invaded Cuba at Playa Giron (Bay of Pigs) with U.S. support, but were defeated in two days. President Kennedy approved Operation MONGOOSE: several attempts to kill Castro, sabotage, arson, crop poisoning and murder of Cuban civilians, with target date for Cuban“revolt” (with U.S. military support!) October 1962. To defend Cuba, Khrushchev offered Castro nuclear-armed missiles to be installed secretly.
CRISIS EVENTS:

• 14 Oct 1962: Kennedy gets U-2 photos of Soviet missile bases in Cuba.
• 17 Oct Wed: 16 missiles installed and would be ready to fire by Oct 24; JCS call for immediate attack; Gen. Le May, USAAF Chief of Staff tells Kennedy an attack is essential and that Soviets will not respond; Defence Secretary McNamara and Robert Kennedy favour blockade; late at night Soviet Ambassador Gromyko visits Kennedy, who does not confront him with the missile evidence thus resulting in the dangerous public challenge and demand for a humiliating withdrawal that Kennedy makes 2 days later; this also excludes U.S. allies from consultation, and leads France later to quit NATO.
• 22 Oct Mon: Kennedy on TV reveals the crisis to Americans, but not the U.S. provocations in Operation MONGOOSE. 42 medium-range nuclear missiles are in Cuba already and 25 Soviet cargo ships heading for Cuba to confront 180 U.S. navy ships, 68 aircraft squadrons and 8 aircraft carriers; U.S. missile crews are on full alert, the B-52 bomber force is ordered into the air fully loaded with nuclear weapons, and in Florida the largest U.S.invasion force since WW II is gathering.
• 23 Oct Tue: Khrushchev, “If the U.S. navy interferes with Soviet ships, necessary measures will be taken.” Organization of America n States gives U.S.A. full support.
• 24 Oct Wed: Quarantine of Cuba goes into effect; Soviet ships approach the 500-mile zone; U-2 photos taken 23 Oct show that the missiles will be ready in a few days; navy reports Soviet subs active; twenty Soviet ships are stopped or turned around, but 6 Soviet subs are approaching Cuba.
• 26 Oct Fri: First ship stopped and boarded (Marucla, Panamanian); Kennedy orders State Department to prepare a post-invasion government for Cuba; at 6:00 pm Khrushchev informs Kennedy, “Missiles in Cuba are defensive and will be withdrawn if U.S.A. agrees not to invade Cuba and to recall its fleet.
• 27 Oct Sat: A tougher Khrushchev proposal: Missiles out and guarantees in Cuba must be matched with the same for U.S. missiles in Turkey; JCS proposes air strike on Monday followed by invasion; U-2 is shot down over Cuba by SAM; JCS insist that the SAM sites be bombed on Sunday, but Kennedy decides to agree to Khrushchev’s Friday proposal.
• 28 Oct Sun: Khrushchev replies at 10:00 a.m., “Missiles will be withdrawn.”

OUTCOME: Cuba secured from U.S. covert attacks and invasion. Kennedy and Khrushchev each almost lost control of the military forces they had set in motion during this crisis.

PERIOD 3 1962-1969 SCARED STRAIGHT

The Cuban missile crisis brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. It was not only the worst crisis to date but was also the worst crisis experience. It brought the reality of nuclear war home to the public and to the two superpower leaders. It scared them straight. The Test Ban Treaty, banning atmospheric nuclear tests, was signed by Kennedy and Khrushchev on 4 August 1963.

An opportunity for further improved relations between the leaders of the superpowers was ended 3 months later by Kennedy’s assassination on 22 November 1963. Khrushchev was ousted 11 months later on 15 October 1964, the day before China exploded her first atomic bomb. The Vietnam War became a major U.S. involvement following the “Gulf of Tonkin incident”, 7 August 1964.

The opportunity for improved superpower relations and nuclear arms control and reductions, faded during the eight years of the Scared Straight period as the Vietnam War escalated and the development of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems accelerated steadily. The terminal event of this crisis-free seven year period came with Crisis # 12, VIETNAM II, caused by Operation DUCKHOOK, Nixon’s secret plan to end the Vietnam war by threatening the use of nuclear weapons.

PERIOD 4 1969-1985 RELENTLESS ARMS RACE

The 1969 Decision by Nixon administration to MIRV the U.S. ICBMs, i.e., to place multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, or warheads, on the U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles, resulted in a serious escalation of the arms race. It meant that one ICBM “bus” could now carry as many as 14 warhead “passengers,” each of which could be directed to its own target. A submarine with 24 Trident MIRVd missiles could thus hit 336 targets. Warhead accuracy improved greatly also and the possibility of a “First Strike” surprise attack that could knock out all of the enemy’s delivery systems seemed within reach. These developments culminated in Crisis # 16, FIRST STRIKE, 1 December 1983 * 19 November 1985, the most dangerous period in human history.

Nuclear Crisis # 12 YEAR: 1969

NAME OF CRISIS: VIETNAM II
THREATENED USE OF N-WEAPONS BY: U.S.A.
TARGET OF WEAPONS: Vietnam and U.S.S.R.
CRISIS STARTS: 4 Aug 1969 (Kissinger in negotiations with Vietnamese implies a nuclear threat)
CRISIS ENDS: 29 Oct 1969 (the DEFCON 1 threat fails)
DURATION: 87 days
THREAT OF NUCLEAR ATTACK: Implied (very strongly)
AT ISSUE IN CRISIS: U.S.A. failure to conquer Vietnam
BACKGROUND: Nixon was elected President in 1968 partly as a result of his claim to have “a secret plan to end the Vietnam War.” His secret plan (DUCKHOOK) was to escalate the war and use nuclear weapons if other measures failed.
CRISIS EVENTS: 1964, Aug: Kissinger meets Vietnamese in Paris, “If no progress by 1 November, U.S.A. will take measures of the gravest consequence.”

• 1 Oct: Strategic Air Command (SAC) is put on DEFCON 1, the “maximum force readiness” for nuclear war; nuclear-armed B-52 bombers circle and Minuteman missiles are put in the highest state of readiness since the CUBA Crisis #11. The clear message to the Soviets is to get North Vietnam to halt operations in South Vietnam.
• 13 Oct: William Watts (NSC) to Kissinger, “Use of nuclear weapons on North Vietnam could throw U.S.A. into turmoil, and need for widespread mobilization of the National Guard and U.S. Army could ensue.”
• 14 Oct: President Nixon, “On October 14, I knew for sure that my ultimatum had failed. A quarter of a million people came to Washington for t he October 15 Moratorium (protest).”
• 29 Oct: North Vietnam does not yield; DEFCON 1 ends after 29 days (the B-52 bombers badly needed servicing, apart from other considerations)

OUTCOME: 1) A clear defeat by Vietnam for Escalation Dominance theory; 2) A measure of the power of massive public protests.

Nuclear Crisis # 13 YEAR: 1970

NAME OF CRISIS: JORDAN
THREATENED USE OF N-WEAPONS BY: U.S.A.
TARGET OF WEAPONS: U.S.S.R.
CRISIS STARTS: 15 Sept 1970
CRISIS ENDS: 30 Sept 1970
DURATION: 2 weeks
THREAT OF NUCLEAR ATTACK: Implied
AT ISSUE IN CRISIS: Control of Jordan
BACKGROUND: Jordan, a strategic pro-western Arab state was threatened by the pro-Soviet Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
CRISIS EVENTS:

• 1970, 15 Sep: King Hussein of Jordan orders his 50,000 man army to destroy the strong PLO bases in Jordan. The possibility of a PLO victory in this strategic Middle East country prompts U.S. support.
• 17 Sep: Amman, capital of Jordan scene of heavy fighting; to keep the Soviets out of the crisis Nixon sends 2 aircraft carrier task forces with 14 destroyers, 1 cruiser, 140 aircraft, 1,200 marines to the East Mediterranean, 3 Army parachute battalions in Europe are mobilized, and the 82nd Airborne Division in Fort Bragg, NC is put on full alert; Kissinger orders the U.S. military to send un-coded messages to make the threat of nuclear armed force deployments very clear.

OUTCOME: PLO defeated in Jordan and there is no Soviet involvement.

Nuclear Crisis # 14 YEAR: 1973

NAME OF CRISIS: ISRAEL (Yom Kippur)
THREATENED USE OF N-WEAPONS BY: U.S.A.
TARGET OF WEAPONS: U.S.S.R.
CRISIS STARTS: 6 Oct 1973 (Egypt and Syria attack Israel)
CRISIS ENDS: 25 Oct 1973
DURATION: 19 days
THREAT OF NUCLEAR ATTACK: Implied
AT ISSUE IN CRISIS: 1) Survival of U.S. ally Israel; 2) U.S. dependence, since 1967, on oil imports, especially from the Middle East.
BACKGROUND: U.N. troops had separated Israel and Egypt since SUEZ Crisis #7 of 1956; in 1967 Nasser demanded their removal, closed Israel’s use of the gulf of Aqaba and blockaded the port of Eilat; Egypt, Syria and Iraq had been heavily armed by the Soviets and now threatened Israel’s survival; Israel attacked, and in the 6-Day War, 5-11 June 1967, defeated Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq and seized Sinai, the Golan Heights, the Jordan West Bank and Jerusalem. Israel had more than doubled its size at the expense of its neighbours,especially Egypt. Egypt and Syria rearmed and prepared to recover their territory and their national pride.
CRISIS EVENTS: 1973, 6 Oct: Egypt and Syria make surprise attack on Israel.

• 20 Oct: Soviets meet Kissinger who promises safety for the Third Army in return for Egyptian concessions. However, Israel violates this ceasefire and maintains pressure on Third Army.
• 24 Oct: U.S. intelligence reports all seven Soviet airborne divisions on alert for possible aid to Third Army; Brezhnev (to Kissinger) blames Israel for ceasefire violations, repeats offer of joint U.S.-Soviet ceasefire enforcement and warns that Soviets will act alone if any further act of bad faith by U.S.A.; emergency meeting in Washington results in a DEFCON 3 alert.
• 25 Oct: U.S. nuclear forces on alert; 50 B-52 strategic bombers fly from Guam to U.S.A.; 15,000 troops of 82nd Airborne Div. mobilise; aircraft carrier John F Kennedy leaves Gibraltar heading east. This escalation is designed to be detected by the Soviets and result in U.S. dominance of the situation, without arousing the U.S. public. However, by 7:00 a.m. U.S. media reports war mobilization and speculation begins that Nixon is using a crisis to escape the growing pressures of the Watergate scandal. However, the crisis eases later that day: Israeli forces relax their pressure on the Third Army and the Soviets drop their insistence on a joint peace-keeping force.

OUTCOME: Soviets soon after described U.S. response in this crisis as“absurd” and U.S. speculations on Soviet intentions as “fantastic”, indicating that the use of Escalation Dominance by the U.S.A. in order to have its way in any confrontation is a dangerous policy.

Nuclear Crisis # 15 YEAR: 1980

NAME OF CRISIS: IRAN II
THREATENED USE OF N-WEAPONS BY: U.S.A.
TARGET OF WEAPONS: Iran, U.S.S.R.
CRISIS STARTS: 23 Jan 1980 (Carter’s threatening speech).
CRISIS ENDS: June (B-52 Arabian Sea flights end)
DURATION: 6 months
THREAT OF NUCLEAR ATTACK: Implied
AT ISSUE IN CRISIS: 1) U.S. loss of control over Iran as strategic Cold War base and major oil producer; 2) Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and possibility of a Soviet move into Iran.
BACKGROUND: Growing U.S. oil assets in the Gulf had been protected by British forces since 1919, but in the 1950s the U.S.A began to take over.
1951: Dr. Mossadegh was elected to power in Iran and announced the nationalization of the highly profitable British oil industry.
1953: Mossadegh was overthrown by a C.I.A. coup directed by Allen Dulles who sent General H. Norman Schwarzkopf (Senior) to supervise the job. Shah Pahlevi, backed by the U.S.A., held power for the next 26 years. The U.S.A. made Iran its main listening post on the Soviet southern border and its main military base in the Gulf. All opposition was dealt with by the dreaded SAVAK secret police. “Iran had the highest rate of death penalties in the world, no valid system of civilian courts and a history of torture which is beyond belief”, said Martin Ennals, Sec.-General of Amnesty International.
1973: Coup in Afghanistan by Mohammed Daud, with whom the Shah had good relations and he sent the SAVAK into Afghanistan to root out communist opposition. The Soviets were alarmed to see formerly neutral and stable Afghanistan moving into the U.S. orbit alongside Turkey and Iran.
1978: Coup in Afghanistan puts Amin, a Marxist-Leninist in power. He ignored Soviet “advice” and tried to push rapid reforms. He also made close contact with U.S.A. through U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubbs.
1979: 16 Jan, Shah fled from Iran after defeat by the one power that he could not crush, the Moslem Mullahs led by Ayatollah Khomeini. U.S.A. lost a highly strategic base and listening post on Soviet border, and a world-class oil supplier, leaving no U.S. or British base in Gulf for the first time in 65 years.

• Sep: Amin in Afghanistan survived attempted coup.
• 4 Nov: U.S. Embassy (in its 22 acre grounds) in Tehran was seized and 46 hostages taken.
• Dec: Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Amin was killed and Babrak Karmal installed as puppet ruler. A long inconclusive guerrilla war started.
  CRISIS EVENTS: 1980 (Presidential election year), 23 Jan: President Carter in his State of the Union speech warns that any Soviet move in the Gulf will be “repelled by military force.” Defense Secretary Brown refers to the possibility of nuclear war between U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.
• 2 Feb: New York Times headline, “Study Says Soviet Move in Iran Might Require U.S. Atom Arms,” based on a leaked, “secret” Pentagon report.
• Jan: First of 12 B-52 flights over the Arabian Sea; these last 6 months.
• 26 Feb: Pravda protests these “most extreme measures”, which fan the flames in the area and deny Soviet interest for invasion of Iran.

OUTCOME: On 22 September 1980, Iraq attacked Iran with the support, as revealed later, of the U.S.A., Britain and U.S.S.R. (!) Over one million were killed in this war, and no U.N. action was taken against Iraq’s aggression, which suited all the major powers for various reasons. Iran was undefeated and Islamic Fundamentalism gained a powerful base. Confident of Western tolerance, Iraq invaded Kuwait and triggered the Gulf War in 1991.

Nuclear Crisis # 16 YEAR: 1983

NAME OF CRISIS: FIRST STRIKE
THREATENED USE OF N-WEAPONS BY: U.S.A.
TARGET OF WEAPONS: U.S.S.R.
CRISIS STARTS: 1 Dec 1983 (9 Pershing II sent to W.Germany)
CRISIS ENDS: 19 Nov 1985 (Gorbachev & Reagan meet Geneva)
DURATION: 2 years
THREAT OF NUCLEAR ATTACK: Implied (at VERY great risk)
AT ISSUE IN CRISIS: U.S. preparation for FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY
BACKGROUND: In the nuclear arms race the U.S.A. had always held a 5 to 10-year lead over the Soviet Union. In the 1980’s a system for a FIRST STRIKE surprise attack on the U.S.S.R. was nearly ready, comprising: 1) Decapitation, the flat trajectory Pershing II missiles being extremely accurate and designed to “decapitate” the Soviet leadership, with flight-time to Moscow from bases in West Germany being only 6 minutes; 2) Counterforce, with the possibility by the late 1980’s of knocking out all known Soviet missiles on land and at sea with MX and Trident-II missiles using the new very precise Navstar guidance system; 3) Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) or “Star Wars”, the“shield” designed to deal with the possibility that a few Soviet missiles might survive the First Strike. These very threatening plans meant that a world nuclear holocaust might result from a faulty Soviet radar warning, since six minutes would give the Soviets grotesquely little time to analyse U.S. intentions. The Soviets understood this threat very clearly, and in 1980,

• 26 Oct: Soviet Premier Andropov stated that the Soviets would walk out of the Geneva talks if deployment of Pershing II and Cruise missiles began.
• 15 Nov: First shipment of Tomahawk Cruise Missiles arrived in Britain.
• 30 Nov: West German parliament voted 286:226 to accept the first shipment of 9 Pershing II missiles on German soil, in spite of demonstrations by 400,000 Germans, during 1983, opposed to their deployment.
  CRISIS EVENTS: 1980, 1 Dec: First Strike nuclear crisis begins with the delivery to Ramstein air base near Mannheim, West Germany by U.S. C-5 Galaxy transports of 9 Pershing II missiles, which are then transported to the U.S. Army 56th Field Artillery Brigade base at Mutlangen. In Geneva the Soviet negotiator Yuli Kvitsinsky walks out of the meeting with U.S. negotiator Paul Nitze, ending the nuclear arms negotiations with no date set to resume.
• 8 Dec: Nuclear Winter, which would kill all survivors of a nuclear war with only half of the U.S. and Soviet weapons used, was predicted in joint statement by 4 U.S. and 4 Soviet scientists meeting in Washington.
  1983-85: One Soviet Soviet response to the threat from the Pershing II and nuclear-armed Cruise missiles is also to arm its submarines on patrol off the U.S. East coast with flat trajectory missiles. This confrontation with hair-trigger nuclear weapon systems makes this the most dangerous period in human history!
  1985, 11 Mar: Gorbachev elected General Secretary of the Central Committee by a margin of one vote over Grishin, a hardliner who would probably have escalated the arms race. This election may well prove to have been a critical event in world history.
• 15 Mar: Nuclear winter “that would wipe out all life on earth .. is all the more reason to continue President Ronald Reagan’s weapons build-up”, Richard Perle, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defence.
• July: Soviets begin a Moratorium on nuclear weapon tests.
• Nov 19 Gorbachev and Reagan meet in Geneva and Cold War tensions ease progressively for the next two years, ending FIRST STRIKE Crisis #16.

OUTCOME: Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed 8 Dec 1987 in Washington by Presidents Gorbachev and Reagan, eliminating all medium* and short-range nuclear weapons. This ended the worst crisis of all, and the end of Cold War followed.

PERIOD 5 1985-1991 GORBACHEV ENDS THE COLD WAR

• 1985, March 11: Mikhail Gorbachev is elected General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s Central Committee, beating his hard-liner rival, Victor Grishin, by one vote. Gorbachev sets to work to end the nuclear arms race and the Cold War in a series of bold and visionary steps.
• Jul: Gorbachev orders the cessation of Soviet nuclear tests, but between July and December the U.S.A. tests 9 nuclear weapons.
• Nov 19: Gorbachev meets U.S. President Reagan at the Geneva Summit, and tensions between U.S.A and U.S.S.R. begin to ease.
• 1986 “International Year of Peace”, with nuclear weapons tests during 1986: U.S.A.: 15 U.S.S.R.: 0
• Oct 11: At the Reykjavik Summit, Gorbachev offers 50% reduction in strategic weapons and removal of all U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe, but Reagan, unprepared, flounders and refuses.
• 1987, Feb: Soviets resume nuclear tests after a 19 month halt.
• Dec 8: Washington: Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty signed by Presidents Gorbachev and Reagan. It will eliminate all medium and short range N-weapons. This marks the end of the First Strike missile crisis and is a landmark event in the approaching end of the Cold War.
• 1989, Feb: Soviets complete their withdrawal from Afghanistan.
• Mar: U.S.S.R. Part of new congress chosen in free elections.
• Jun: Elections in Poland give Solidarity a majority.
• Nov: Berlin Wall is demolished.
• 1991, Jun: Yeltsin becomes President of Supreme Soviet after the first free national elections.
• Aug 19: Gorbachev toppled in abortive coup by old guard communist hard-liners. Had they won, and they nearly did, the nuclear-arms race could well have resumed its fatal course.
• Dec 8: Yeltsin meets with the leaders of the Ukraine and White Russia and abolishes the U.S.S.R. (with no mandate to do this).

PERIOD 6 1991 POST COLD WAR RE-GROUPING

Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, the United States has emerged as the world’s number one superpower. A dangerous conclusion is that the U.S.A. “won the Cold War” with Ronald Reagan’s weapons build-up, but Vladimir Pozner’s comments in the APPENDIX refute this.

This period is similar to the SCARED STRAIGHT period after the CUBA CRISIS #11. It provides a precious opportunity for nuclear disarmament. In 1996 Russia is in economic and political turmoil, China is rapidly emerging as a world power, there are still 36,000 nuclear weapons in the world, and the world situation is not stable.

The balanced reduction and total abolition of these weapons, on a rigid schedule is a matter of great urgency; the present lull in great power rivalry may not last long.

SOURCES

1. Truman, H.S. “Year of Decisions, Vol.1”, “ Years of Trial and Hope, Vol.2”, Garden City, Doubleday, 1955.
2. Eisenhower, Dwight D., “Mandate for Change”, Garden City, Doubleday, 1963.
3. Schlesinger, A.M. “A Thousand Days”, Cambridge, Houghton Mifflin, 1965.
4. Kennedy, Robert.E. “Thirteen Days”, McCall’s Magazine, November 1968.
5. Lapp, Ralph E. “The Weapons Culture”, New York, Norton, 1968.
6. Ambrose, Stephen E., “Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy, 1938-1980”, Pelican History of the U.S.A., Penguin, 1980.
7. Aldridge, R.C. “First Strike! The Pentagon’s Strategy for Nuclear War”, Boston, South End Press, 1983.
8. Peterson, Jeannie, ed. “The Aftermath: Human & Ecological Consequences of Nuclear War”, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, New York, Pantheon, 1983.
9. Prins, Gwynn ed. “Defended to Death: A Study of the Nuclear Arms Race From the Cambridge University Disarmament Seminar”, Harmondsworth, U.K., Penguin, 1983.
10. Kaku, Michio, Axelrod, Daniel, “To Win a Nuclear War: The Pentagon’s Secret War Plans”, Montreal, Black Rose, 1987.
11. Pozner, Vladimir, “Eyewitness: A Personal Account of the Unravelling of the Soviet Union”, New York, Random House, 1992.

APPENDIX

Pages 191-192 of SOURCE 11) states: “American conservatives love to take credit for the ‘fall of communism’. It was all thanks to Ronald Reagan, they will tell you, to his policy of getting tough with the Russkies, of launching SDI, more commonly known as ‘star wars’ -- that was what ended the communist empire! What self serving stupidity; what a misleading, self-indulging understanding of history. Just one vote, one single vote from a hand up to a hand held down, would have changed the world. Ronald Reagan and the entire American right wing had nothing to do with Grishin’s loss to Gorbachev.

The men who then made up the Politburo -- people like Gromyko and Ustinov -- had built their entire careers on not giving a hoot in hell what the rest of the world thought. They were all hard liners in the worst sense of the word. I think that had Grishin been elected, the United States and the Soviet Union would have been at war within two or three years maximum.

Ronald Reagan’s ticket to the White House had, among other things, been won on his promise to get tough with the Russians. There are not a few people who attribute the demise of communism (that is how they refer to the events of Perestroika) to President Reagan’s military build-up, to his forcing of the Soviets into an arms race they could not match. What that argument ignores are at least two things. First, that Reagan had nothing to do with Gorbachev’s becoming General Secretary -- that should now be clear to the reader. Second, that by the time Gorbachev was elected General Secretary, Reagan had been in office for slightly more than one full term. During that period he had more than fulfilled his ‘get tough’ promise.

The net result was that the relationship between the U.S.S.R. and the United States stood at an all-time low. The danger of military conflict had increased and Soviet defense production was up. Neither Brezhnev, Andropov nor Chernenko had demonstrated the slightest inclination to back down. Victor Grishin and his supporters were of the same ilk. There is no reason at all to believe that they would have been more reasonable. Conversely, there is every reason to think they would have pushed the nuclear button had they been backed into a corner.

We should all thank our lucky stars for Gorbachev’s one-vote win. Thank fate, thank whatever deity or superstition you believe in. But the one group we should not thank is the American conservative establishment, which had the stupidity and arrogance to think it could play chicken with its Soviet counterparts and win.”

Subject: Cold War N-Crisis #16: FIRST STRIKE
Date: Thu, 22 Oct 1998 19:31:06 -0400 (EDT)
From: David Morgan

Greetings fellow VANA members:

Here is some additional info on Crisis #16 FIRST STRIKE, which always seemed to me to be the Cold War’s longest, most dangerous and least recognized crisis of all.
Best wishes,
David

The Sunday Times (London), November 30 1997

Kremlin was poised to launch nuclear strike
by Nicholas Hellen Media Correspondent

THE WORLD came much closer to nuclear conflict in the final stages of the cold war than was previously thought, according to evidence from former Soviet bloc archives.

The Kremlin was so alarmed by Ronald Reagan’s plans for the strategic defence initiative -- star wars -- and his deployment of cruise missiles in Europe during the early 1980s that it planned a pre-emptive nuclear strike against Britain and other American allies.

Documents unearthed in former East German military archives reveal the depth of Soviet paranoia at the hawkish stance of Reagan and Margaret Thatcher during the early 1980s in the wake of Russian military success in Afghanistan.

Among the papers are minutes from a meeting of the Warsaw Pact military committee in April 1983 at which Soviet generals warned that there was a real possibility of nuclear conflict. “They said they were heading for war,” said Beatrice Heuser, a military historian from King’s College, London, who has seen the documents. “It had moved beyond cold war rhetoric.”

The minutes are from a series of volumes called the War Diaries. The grey-bound documents were so secret that East German generals interviewed by Heuser and other researchers from King’s College were not aware of their existence.

The evidence is expected to feature in a landmark documentary from the makers of the 1970s series The World at War, the definitive small-screen account of the second world war. Cold War is produced by Sir Jeremy Isaacs and financed by Ted Turner, the billionaire founder of CNN. The researchers from King’s College are acting as consultants. It will be screened on the BBC next autumn.

The television series has been in production for three years and draws on eyewitness accounts from the Yalta conference of 1945 to the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. Interviewees include former American presidents George Bush and Jimmy Carter. Isaacs hopes to secure the co-operation of Baroness Thatcher.

Isaacs, whose stint as general director of the Royal Opera House ended amid criticism this year, hopes to repeat his earlier success as a programme-maker. Kenneth Branagh, the actor, is to emulate the stirring narrative of the late Lord Olivier, who provided the voice-over for The World at War.

The East German papers reveal how in November 1983, as peace protesters broke into the Greenham Common military base where the Americans stationed cruise missiles, the Soviet military was planning a possible strike. Barely 800 miles from London, aircraft capable of delivering nuclear strikes were placed on standby at East German air bases. On November 9, KGB stations in Europe were warned that American bases had been put on alert. The KGB suspected that a Nato exercise, Able Archer 83, could be a full-scale nuclear assault.

The cold war had reached boiling point. Before November, there had been signs of mounting tension. In 1981, Leonid Brezhnev, then Soviet president, put his intelligence services on an unprecedented state of alert because of concern about star wars and inflamed anti-communist rhetoric in the West.

Fear on both sides reached new heights when Soviet air defence forces shot down a Korean airliner, KAL-007, in September. Initially the KGB maintained this was a western spy plane and ordered that all Soviet bases be secured against imminent western attack. On September 8, Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet foreign minister, warned: “The world situation is now slipping towards a very dangerous situation.” Few, until now, knew just how serious.

According to Heuser, Thatcher was warned by MI6 that the game of brinkmanship in late 1983 risked a disastrous outcome.

The American deployment of cruise missiles was intended to give Nato the opportunity of fighting a limited nuclear war in Europe, rather than risk an immediate escalation to global destruction. But, according to Heuser, it was interpreted in Moscow as evidence of a more belligerent strategy which implied that the West believed it could win a nuclear exchange. In the spring of 1984, Thatcher convinced Reagan that he had to defuse the crisis and open meaningful talks with Moscow about arms limitation.

According to some historians, the real threat of war matched that of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis in which Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet president, ordered the deployment of 80 nuclear warheads on the island.

Professor Lawrence Freedman, professor of war studies at King’s College, said that the events of November 1983 would force a reinterpretation of the true threat to global peace posed during the closing years of the cold war.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_198000/198173.stm
Wednesday, October 21, 1998 BBC Online
‘How I stopped nuclear war’

Allan Little reports:

Fifteen years ago, a Russian army officer, detecting an incoming missile strike, disobeyed procedure and reported a false alarm. In so doing he saved the world from possible nuclear catastrophe.

But he did so at the cost of his health and his job.

Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States depended on a system of Mutually Assured Destruction, or MAD, which was deemed to have kept the peace in Europe for half a century. Both superpowers kept arsenals containing thousands of nuclear warheads targeted on enemy cities. “Deterrence through the balance of terror”, combined with computerised surveillance and early warning systems, ensured that any attack would be followed immediately by counterattack. But MAD failed to take into account one dangerous possibility * computer error.

On the night of 26 September 1983, Stanislav Petrov, a young army software engineer, was on duty at a surveillance center near Moscow. “Suddenly the screen in front of me turned bright red,” said Petrov. “An alarm went off. It was piercing, loud enough to raise a dead man from his grave.” “The computer showed that the Americans had launched a nuclear strike against us.” A second alarm followed, then a third. “I knew the system could be at fault, so I reported this as a false alarm.”

‘A big risk’

Petrov’s orders were to pass the information up the chain of command, to then-General Secretary Yuri Andropov. Within minutes, a massive nuclear counterattack would be launched.

Petrov’s decision to disobey procedure was intuitive; “The thought crossed my mind that maybe someone had really launched a strike against us. That made it even harder to lift the receiver and say it was just a false alarm.”

“I understood that I was taking a big risk.” When the computer error was reported, the army began a massive internal inquiry. But instead of being commended for his courage and quick thinking, Petrov was blamed.

Once a promising, twice-decorated young officer, Petrov took early retirement from the army and later suffered a nervous breakdown.

“I was made the scapegoat. That was our system, the old Soviet system, in the old Soviet army.”